Patient distribution in a mass casualty event of an airplane crash  by Postma, Ingri L.E. et al.
Injury, Int. J. Care Injured 44 (2013) 1574–1578Patient distribution in a mass casualty event of an airplane crash
Ingri L.E. Postma a,1,2,*, Hanneke Weel b,1,2, Martin J. Heetveld c,1, Ineke van der Zande d,1,
Taco S. Bijlsma e,1,3, Frank W. Bloemers b,1, J. Carel Goslings a,1
aAcademic Medical Center, Trauma Unit Department of Surgery, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
bVU University Medical Center, Department of Trauma Surgery, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
cKennemer Gasthuis, Department of Surgery, Haarlem, The Netherlands
d Safety Region Kennemerland, The Netherlands
e Spaarne Hospital, Department of Surgery, Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Accepted 28 April 2013
Keywords:
Airplane crash
Disaster
Mass casualty incident
Patient distribution
Critical mortality rate
A B S T R A C T
Introduction: Difﬁculties have been reported in the patient distribution during Mass Casualty Incidents.
In this study we analysed the regional patient distribution protocol (PDP) and the actual patient
distribution after the 2009 Turkish Airlines crash near Amsterdam.
Methods: Analysis of the patient distribution of 126 surviving casualties of the crash by collecting data
on medical treatment capacity, number of patients received per hospital, triage classiﬁcation, Injury
Severity Score (ISS), secondary transfers, distance from the crash site, and the critical mortality rate.
Results: The PDP holds ambiguous deﬁnitions of medical treatment capacity and was not followed. There
were 14 receiving hospitals (distance from crash: 5.8–53.5 km); four hospitals received 133–213% of
their treatment capacity, and 5 hospitals received 1 patient. Three hospitals within 20 km of the crash did
not receive any casualties. Level I trauma centres received 89% of the ‘critical’ casualties and 92% of the
casualties with ISS  16. Only 3 casualties were secondarily transferred, and no casualties died in, or on
the way to hospital (critical mortality rate = 0%).
Conclusion: Patient distribution worked out well after the crash as secondary transfers were low and
critical mortality rate was zero. However, the regional PDP was not followed in this MCI and casualties
were unevenly distributed among hospitals. The PDP is indistinctive, and should be updated in
cooperation between Emergency Services, surrounding hospitals, and Schiphol International Airport as a
high risk area.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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On February the 25th 2009 ﬂight TK1951 from Turkish Airlines
crashed nearby Schiphol Airport Amsterdam, the Netherlands. One
hundred and thirty ﬁve occupants were aboard, 126 survived the
crash. In dealing with a large amount of casualties with a high
energy trauma mechanism, management of patient distribution
was a challenge.Abbreviations: ESC, Emergency Services Centre; ISS, Injury Severity Score; MCI,
Mass Casualty Incident(s); PDP, Patient Distribution Plan(s).
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Center, Meibergdreef 9, 1105 AZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.injury.2013.04.027Preparation for disasters and Mass Casualty Incidents (MCIs) is
a difﬁcult but important task. Numerous casualties must be
triaged, transported and treated at the appropriate hospital
without overwhelming any of the hospitals. Disaster protocols
are developed to offer guidance in executing these tasks. The
literature reports different kinds of problems in patient distribu-
tion during MCIs, and more important, the same errors seem to be
repeated in following disasters or MCIs.1–6 To prepare for MCIs it is
important to evaluate and report the outcomes of previous MCIs. In
this study we evaluated the patient distribution after the MCI of
the Turkish Airlines crash on February 25th 2009, near Amsterdam.
This paper describes the analysis of the following research
questions:
1. How is medical response to Mass Casualty Incidents (MCIs) and
patient distribution organised in the Netherlands, with special
attention to high risk areas such as Schiphol International
Airport?
2. How was the patient distribution executed in this MCI and was it
carried out according to the regional patient distribution
protocol (PDP)?
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We collected the national and regional MCI plans and protocols
that were applicable to the airplane crash, in order to analyse the
general MCI response plans and speciﬁcally the regional patient
distribution protocol (PDP).7–11 Since the crash some protocols
have already been in revision. In this analysis we studied the
situation as it was at the time of the crash.
For the second question we analysed the events on the day of
the crash, by studying evaluation reports of the Dutch Safety Board
and the evaluation report of the Public Order and Safety
Inspectorate in cooperation with the Health Inspectorate.12–14
We analysed the medical charts of ambulances and hospitals of all
casualties of the crash. We speciﬁcally looked at the number of
casualties the hospitals received, whether these hospitals had
activated their hospital disaster plan and the distance from the
crash site to the receiving hospital. The latter was calculated with
the route planner of the Royal Dutch Touring Club (Dutch acronym
ANWB).15
Additionally we collected the triage classiﬁcation (P1, P2, P3) of
the casualties and their Injury Severity Score (ISS).16–18 To evaluate
the patient distribution outcome, we looked at the secondary
transfers and critical mortality rate.1–2 The critical mortality rate
expresses the quality of triage and patient distribution as a ratio
between critically injured casualties and in-hospital (or on-
transport) mortality. This is based on the fact that critically
injured casualties beneﬁt the most of rapid transport to an
appropriate facility. We compared the data of the patient
distribution after the crash to the regional PDP.
Results
The Netherlands (16.7 million inhabitants, 41,526 square km) is
divided in 25 Safety Regions. The safety regions have their own
Emergency Services Centre (ESC), with in total 215 ambulance
stations for in almost 700 ambulances.19 Each safety Region is
responsible for their regional disaster protocol, which should be in
accordance with the national disaster protocols. Different high risk
areas, involving different kinds of risks (e.g. North Sea Channel,
chemical industry areas), all have their own protocols. Some
involve several safety regions for one overlapping high risk area.
When an incident involves an airplane crash at Schiphol Airport
Amsterdam the Aircraft Accident Schiphol (Dutch acronym VOS)
protocol is used. The medical response of this system is presented
in Table 1. Each safety region has its own Emergency Services
Centre (ESC), receiving calls for emergency assistance and
coordinating the dispatches of these emergency responders
(police, ﬁre department, and ambulance services).
In the Netherlands hospitals are equipped according to Level I, II
or II standards. Level I hospitals have full trauma care facilities.
When a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) occurs, a number of hospitals
can be put on alert by the Emergency Services Centre (ESC)
(Table 1) or can be requested to activate their hospital disaster plan
(Dutch acronym: ZiROP). When the hospital disaster plan isTable 1
Airplane accident Schiphol (AAS).
Scale Type of incident Medica
AAS 1 Pan-pan call 2 Ambu
AAS 2–4 Mayday call 5–14 A
AAS 5 Crash < 50 occupants 25 Amb
AAS 6 Crash 50–250 occupants 64 Amb
AAS 7 Crash > 250 occupants 126 Am
a Medical Combination Team: 1 trauma team (doctor + nurse), 2 ambulance teams, 1activated extra capacity is created to receive and treat casualties.
The Netherlands also has a Major Incident Hospital situated at the
Military Hospital in Utrecht, with a liaison with the University
Medical Centre Utrecht. Within 30 min they are ready to receive
100 patients. If needed, in 1 h this facility is able to upscale to 250–
300 patients.20
In case of a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI), casualties are triaged
at the scene following the critical/immediate (P1), serious/urgent
(P2), minor/delayed (P3) triage classiﬁcation according to the
Triage Sieve and Sort system used by the MIMMS (Major Incident
Medical Management and Support).16 Then the casualties are
transported to hospital according to urgency. The distribution of
the casualties among different hospitals is executed according to
the regional patient distribution protocol (PDP) of the safety region
involved.
Since 2008 Schiphol Airport falls under the responsibility of
safety region Kennemerland. Geographically though, Schiphol lies
on the border of 2 safety regions. The regional PDP was last
updated in 2008. When the number of casualties is high and
exceeds the coordinating capacity of ambulance personnel and
centralists, a special patient distribution coordinator is sent to the
scene.9,11,21
In the existing patient distribution protocol (PDP), the general
medical treatment capacity per hospital is deﬁned as one critically
or seriously injured patient (P1 or P2) per emergency team per
hospital in the ﬁrst hour. In the second hour an extra 2 P1 or P2
patients can be received per emergency team in Level I or II trauma
centres. The PDP does not describe the number of emergency
teams per hospital.9
The PDP mentions that, according to government requirements,
in case of a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI), hospitals should be able
to clear 3% of their total bed capacity. However, the PDP also states
that in daily practice hospitals only agreed upon clearing only 1%,
because 3% appeared to be not reasonably possible. We consider
this 3% medical treatment capacity as the maximum number of
casualties able to be presented at the emergency department. In
the regional PDP of safety region Kennemerland, there is
information about 30 hospitals with a (presumed) total bed
capacity of 14,398 beds. These total bed capacity numbers,
however, are actually outdated because of the mergers of several
hospitals and the increase in outpatient treatments. In the PDP
medical treatment capacity numbers are mentioned based on 1%
and on 3% of total bed capacity. The receiving hospitals and their
medical treatment capacity are in Table 2.
The distribution of casualties is further decided upon by the
triage classiﬁcation of the casualties and the proximity of the
hospitals. The PDP has the rationale that, in MCIs in the primary
distribution phase, no consideration is given to injury type or
severity (e.g. burn injuries). Only in the secondary, deﬁnitive,
distribution phase some patients may be transferred to specialised
centres if necessary.
After the Turkish Airlines Crash the ﬁrst reports of the accident
came into the Emergency Services Centre (ESC) one minute after
the crash at 10:27 a.m.12,14 Eighty two ambulances from differentl response
lances 1 Medical Ofﬁcer
mbulances; 1 Medial combination teama; 1–2 Medical ofﬁcers; 1–6 Hospitals
ulances; 1 Medial combination teama; 2 Medical ofﬁcers; 7–13 Hospitals
ulances; 5 Medical combination teamsa; 4 Medical ofﬁcers; 7–13 Hospitals
bulances; 10 Medical Combination teamsa; 7 Medical ofﬁcers; 13–22 Hospitals
 Rapid Response Team for Medical Assistance, (Dutch acronym, SIGMA team).
Table 2
Hospitals, distance, medical treatment capacity (MTC), and hospital disaster plan (HDP).
Hospital (trauma level) Distance from crash site, by road in km 1% MTC 3% MTC No of casualties received HDP put into action?
VU Medical Center (I) 14.7 6 17 25 (147%) Yes
Academic Medical Center (I) 23.8 9 26 19 (73%) Yes
Leiden University Medical Center (I) 32.9 9 25 4 (16%) No
University Medical Center Utrecht (I) 53.5 8 24 4 (17%) No
Kennemergasthuis (II) 5.8 6 15 32 (213%) Yes
St. Lucas Andreas Hospital (II) 10.6 6 18 1 (6%) No
Red Cross Hospital (II) 16.8 4 9 12 (133%) Yes
Medical Center Alkmaar (II) 34.1 9 26 1 (4%) Yes
Westfriesgasthuis (II) 47.4 5 15 1 (7%) No
Haga hospital (II) 51.5 Not in PDP Not in PDP 4 No
Spaarne Hospital (III) 8.7 4 9 13 (144%) Yes
Slotervaart Hospital (III) 11.6 4 12 6 (50%) Yesa
Diaconessen Hospital (III) 32.5 2 9 1 (11%) No
Flevo Hospital (III) 44.3 2 5 1 (20%) No
Total 74 210 124
Hospitals close but not used: OLVG (II) 17.1 km, de Heel ZMC (III) 19.1 km, BovenIJ 19.6 km, Amstelland (III) 17.7 km.
a No ofﬁcial request.
90
100
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Helicopter Emergency Medical Service teams. Difﬁculties in
communication and distribution of tasks led to some response
units being informed late. The ﬁrst ambulance was alerted in 2 min
and the ﬁrst to arrive at the crash did so after 18 min. The ﬁrst
helicopter emergency medical team was alerted 35 min after the
crash and arrived 55 min after the crash.
The person that was on call as the patient distribution
coordinator was, at the moment of the crash, also working as an
operator at the ESC and could therefore not execute his task as
patient distribution coordinator. An ambulance nurse at the scene
was ad hoc appointed as a substitute coordinator, but was not
acquainted with the regional patient distribution protocol (PDP). It
was later reported by ofﬁcials that the actual patient distribution
coordinator on call was also not familiar with the actual PDP.14
Approximately one hour after the crash the estimation of the
amount of casualties was 16 P1, 30 P2 and about 80 P3. At 14:00
(3.5 h after the crash) the reports were 25 P1, approximately 25 P2,
about 60 P3 and 9 fatalities.12,14 At ﬁrst, about half of the casualties
were transported directly to hospitals by ambulance or casualty
bus. At a casualty clearing station, some of the previously triaged
P3 casualties were found to have major injuries at re-triage. At this
point all remaining casualties were also transported to hospital.
We were unable to retrieve much precise information about
triage. Most prehospital triage information was either not well
documented or lost. Inhospital triage information was based on
retrospective interviews with receiving hospitals and was pub-
lished in the evaluation report of the Dutch Public Order and Safety
Inspectorate.12 The ISS’ (Injury Severity Scores) (calculated from
the medical records off all patients) are presented in Table 3. One of
the 13 patients with an ISS  16 was not immediately transported
to a level I trauma centre, but was ﬁrst evaluated at a level 3Table 3
No. of casualties per hospital.
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Total
P1 31 (89%) 4 (11%) – 35
P2 23 (57% 7 (18%) 10 (25%) 40
P3 5 (10%) 37 (79%) 7 (14%) 49
ISS  16 12 (92%) (+1a) – 1 (8%) (1a) 13
ISS 8–15 14 (64%) (+2a) 6 (27%) (2a) 2 (9%) 22
ISS < 8 26 (29%) 45 (51%) 18 (20%) 89
52 51 21 124
Rows 1–3: estimated numbers as reported in investigational reports (12; 14).
a +1, +2 and 1, 2: refers to secondary transfers.hospital. When the extent and type of his injuries was known and
the patient stable, he was transferred to a level I trauma centre.
Another 2 patients were transferred from a level II hospital to a
level I hospital because the receiving hospital lacked the
specialised facilities to treat their injuries.
Results of the time until presentation at the emergency
department in Fig. 1. Nine people did not survive the crash; they
all died at the scene. No casualties died in or on the way to hospital;
the ‘critical mortality rate’ therefore was 0%.1,2,22
The ambulances transported the casualties to 14 different
hospitals varying from 5.8 to 53.5 km from the crash site (Table 2).
There were 4 hospitals (1 level II, 3 level III) within 25 kilometres of
the crash that did not receive any casualties. Two casualties left the
crash site by themselves, but came to a hospital later for a physical
examination. These 2 casualties are not included in our results.
At ﬁrst 3 regional hospitals (level II and III) were alerted by the
Emergency Services Centre (ESC) 24 min after the crash. About
15 min later two 2 level I hospitals received a request to put their
disaster plan in action, as did another 4 smaller hospitals (of which
the 3 alerted earlier).14 One other hospital close to the crash site
(11.6 km) put their disaster plan into action, without formal
request from the ESC. The hospitals are laid out in Table 2. The
Major Incident Hospital in Utrecht was not requested to prepare to
receive casualties.
Four hospitals with activated disaster plans received more
patients (147–213%) than their 3% medical treatment capacity.
Five hospitals, one of which was ofﬁcially requested to activate the0
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Fig. 1. Time of arrival at Emergency Department.
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reported to the authors that, because of a failing communication
system and the lack of patient distribution coordination, ambu-
lances transported patients to their own insight. This was often to
the hospital they were most acquainted with.
Discussion
This study found that without formally using a patient
distribution protocol (PDP) a critical mortality rate of 0% can be
accomplished in a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) with 126
casualties. It was not possible however to evaluate the effects
on morbidity. But patient distribution will be faster and safer when
a clear protocol is operated by the emergency services.
The impact zone of the runways and approach routes of
Schiphol airport extend into 4 safety regions. Only 3 hospitals, out
of 11 situated within 25 km of Schiphol airport, are within the
geographical borders of the safety region concerned with the
management of a MCI at the airport. The 82 responding
ambulances came from at least 5 different safety regions. This
shows that in the Netherlands, patient distribution in a MCI,
especially in high risk areas like an international airport, almost
automatically involves several safety regions.
The existing PDP is based on a rationale of primary distribution
without attention to speciﬁc injuries and specialisations available
in hospitals. In this MCI the patients were casualties of an airplane
crash that ended up in a ﬁeld. It was difﬁcult for the walking
casualties to get away on their own, so emergency services had
good control over the patient distribution. If a MCI would take
place in an urban setting, less injured casualties would be taken to
hospitals in civilian cars or the ‘walking wounded’ will go on foot.
This will result in an uncontrolled ﬂow of casualties at the nearest
hospital.1,23,24 This must be taken in consideration when planning
patient distribution.
The existing regional (PDP) does not clearly deﬁne how many
casualties each hospital can receive and how many emergency
teams are present. The 3% medical treatment capacity is based on
total bed capacity, but does not reﬂect the true treatment capacity
of hospitals’ emergency department. The medical treatment
capacity of the 2 Level I trauma centres in Amsterdam, as reported
in the Patient Distribution Plan, is 26 and 17. In practice their actual
treatment capacity in a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) would likely
be different, if treatment capacity would be based on available
resources, like the number of trauma teams, trauma room capacity,
operating theatre, ICU capacity, etc.3,26
The execution of the patient distribution after the Turkish
Airlines crash was suboptimal, partially because of problems in
communication, as has been reported in many other MCIs.4,24–28 It
also appeared to be difﬁcult to work according to the patient
distribution protocol (PDP) because the patient distribution
coordinator on call was not able to take on his function and it
later appeared that the assigned coordinators were not properly
familiarised with the PDP of the Safety Region. The patient
distribution coordinator and other ofﬁcers on call must therefore
be free from all other tasks to be able to take on this duty in case of
a MCI. Everyone involved in the management of an MCI should be
properly trained for his individual task and this training should
be repeated in MCI exercises every few years.
The Dutch government has stated that ambulances should be
able to reach 95% of all inhabitants within 15 min.29 The ﬁrst
ambulance to reach the crash site in Turkish airline crash, did so
3 min late, despite the short distance.14 This may partly explained
by the terrain the airplane wreckage was located in. The
government also states that the assistance of the helicopter
emergency medical services is only useful when they can provide
this assistance within 30 min.30,31 In this crash the helicopteremergency medical services were called upon only after 35 min.
The ﬁrst helicopter to arrive after 55 min also did not meet the
current national standards.
Only 4 (11%) of the critically injured (P1) casualties and 1 multi-
trauma casualty (ISS  16) was not primarily transported to a Level
I trauma centre (Table 2). Just 3 secondarily transfers were needed
which demonstrates good patient distribution, as does the critical
mortality rate, which was 0%. Although the patient distribution
had no inﬂuence on the critical mortality rate; we cannot say
whether it had an inﬂuence on morbidity.
In the Turkish Airlines crash it was not clear which Emergency
Services Centre alerted which hospital or trauma team.14 Six
hospitals in 3 safety regions received the request to put their
hospital disaster plan into action after more than 40 min. This is
late, considering it takes time to execute the disaster plan.
Casualties were transported to 14 hospitals, half of which were
more than 30 km away from the site of the crash. Four hospitals
are situated within 25 km by road did not receive any patients. If
all hospitals within 25 km had been considered, 11 hospitals of
which 2 Level I, 4 Level II and 5 Level III (with a medical treatment
capacity of 162) would have been sufﬁcient to cope with all
casualties. In this Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) it was not
necessary to involve the Major Incident Hospital in Utrecht,
because there was enough treatment capacity in the area.
Whether the use of a major incident hospital would have been
more efﬁcient and practical in terms of costs, patient distribution,
casualty identiﬁcation, etc. has never been studied to our
knowledge.
Four hospitals received more casualties than described in the
patient distribution protocol (PDP), exceeding their assigned (3%)
medical treatment capacity with 133–223%. Four other hospitals
nearby did not receive casualties and 3 hospitals just received 4–
11% of their treatment capacity. One hospital was ofﬁcially
requested to put their disaster plan into action, but received only
1 casualty. Another hospital that put their disaster plan into action
without request (but did so because of close proximity to the crash
site) received just 6 patients. Activating the hospital disaster plan
and receiving only a few casualties resulted in unnecessary
ﬁnancial losses in this MCI.
After the Turkish Airlines crash the safety region Kennemerland
has started to revise its patient distribution protocol and has taken
in account suggestions made by the MOTAC study group based on
this study. Efforts are made to create a new nationwide rationale in
patient distribution.
Conclusions
In this Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) the existing Patient
Distribution Plan (PDP) appeared to be indistinctive and did not
account enough for multi-regional medical response for MCIs in
the large high risk area of Schiphol International Airport. However,
the critical mortality rate of 0% and low secondary transfer rate
shows that patient distribution worked out well in this crash. Lack
of communication and a non-functioning PDP led to hospitals
being uninformed about the expected casualties and to unneces-
sary loss of regular treatment capacity in some.
We recommend that PDPs are revised to national standards
with speciﬁcations for high risk areas like Schiphol Airport. The
Emergency Services Centre, the hospitals and Schiphol Airport
should cooperate to revise these PDPs.
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